By Jide Akinsemoyin
The victory of the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) in the Austrian General election of 29th September 2024, marked the latest in a series of far-right shifts in the political landscape of Europe. Earlier that same month in Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany party (AfD) won a state election (Thuringia) for the first time since World War II, whilst also achieving record results in the eastern states of Brandenburg and Saxony. With Federal elections scheduled for next year September, the party is currently second in the German national polls, indicating the strength of the upcoming challenge for the ruling Social Democratic Party (SDP).
Back in 2022, the French legislative elections in June saw Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement National win 89 seats in parliament (compared to the 8 they had won in the previous election in 2017), transforming the party into a major force in French politics. In September, the far-right Sweden Democrats party (Sverigedemokraterna) won 20.5% of the votes cast in the Swedish General election, becoming the second largest party in parliament. Later that month, the Italian General election was won by the right-wing Brothers of Italy party, making its leader Giorgia Meloni, the first female Prime Minister of Italy. Finally, in the Dutch General Election held in November 2023, Geert Wilders far-right Freedom party (PVV) won 37 seats in parliament, significantly more than its nearest rival. A common theme across all six of these elections were the interrelated issues of immigration and asylum seekers.
The rise of far-right parties across Europe represents a direct threat to the established order in the region, particularly with regards to the breakdown of political alliances and systems designed to keep such parties from power. This could in turn give rise to political instability, increased social tensions spurred on by anti-immigrant rhetoric, a retreat from democratic institutions and norms, championing of protectionist policies and a strain on international relations, particularly within the European Union itself.
The response of the European Union (EU) and member states to far right gains have been largely inadequate, focussing more on solutions that merely shift the problem from one point to another, rather than addressing the underlying causes of migration. Take for example Germany’s announcement in September of a temporary tightening of immigration controls at all nine of its land boarders despite it being bound by the European Schengen zone open borders agreement. Neighbours Poland and Austria responded by calling the move unacceptable and illegal, highlighting the ineffectiveness of a unilateral, go-it alone approach to solving the migrant problem, and the adverse effect this could have on relations between EU member states.
Although measures adopted by Italy’s newly elected government have resulted in a 60% drop in illegal migration into the country, it was achieved through a series of measures that again passed the problem from point A to point B, whilst ignoring the underlying causes. Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez summed it up perfectly after an EU Press Conference saying Italy’s brokering of a 5-year deal between Italy and Albania in 2023 for the establishment of migrant centres in the country, merely “creates new problems” and “does not address any”. The same could be said of the migration deal signed in 2015 between Turkey and the EU. Since then, the EU has given Turkey in excess of EUR 11 billion to help it support, shelter and manage nearly 4 million Syrian refugees who would otherwise have become the EUs problem.
Adding an extra level of complexity to the migrant problem is the EU’s demographic challenge. According to Eurostat, more than a fifth of the EU population is now aged 65 years or older. That figure is expected to reach a third by 2050. With such an aged population it is clear that despite the large influx of migrants to Europe over the last two decades, the region still needs to attract more workers whose taxes will help cover the growing cost of public pensions. Economists predict that by 2050, there will be less than two workers in Europe for every retiree, compared to three now.
The EU’s problem as far as it relates to migration is therefore two-fold. It needs a solution that brings down EU migration to manageable levels. To achieve this, that same solution must tackle the EU’s migrant problem at source (i.e., address the reasons why migrants are leaving their home countries in the first place). These steps are necessary if the EU is to avert a potential humanitarian disaster developing on its doorstep.
The desire that drives some people to risk all in search of a better life is not one that can be easily extinguished, particularly when such huge wealth disparities exist between rich and poor countries. To this end, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia for a “strategic and comprehensive partnership” aimed at combatting irregular migration and boosting economic ties between the EU and the North African country, is certainly a step in the right direction. That is if “boosting economic ties” means inclusive economic growth that creates local jobs for Tunisians and is not simply an attempt to cynically move the migrant problem from the EU border to the Tunisian border.
As of 2023, Tunisia, along with Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, made up the largest migrant group to the EU. According to the European Agency for the management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), the number of irregular border crossings at the EU’s external borders reached a total of 380,000 in that year, driven mainly by a rise in arrivals via the Central Mediterranean route (i.e., the route used by migrants from these three countries), which accounted for two out of every five irregular border crossings into the EU.
The Tunisian economy has long suffered from structural imbalances driven by urbanisation. This has led to the concentration of 85% of economic activities and 90% of employment opportunities in coastal regions. In contrast, the interior regions which are dominated by agricultural activities, remain entirely rural and poor. Poverty rates are highest in these areas, particularly in the northwest and southwest of the country where they are in excess of 33% in some areas. In contrast, in the greater Tunis area on the coast poverty rates are as low as 4.6%. Fixing these regional disparities and reducing poverty is therefore key to improving the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the country that is driving Tunisians to migrate in such numbers.
Guinea should be a rich country but instead is one of the poorest countries in the world. Despite having the second-largest bauxite reserves in the world, the highest-grade iron ore in the world, and substantial diamond and gold resources, it has made little or no economic progress due to the focus of foreign investors on extraction and capital repatriation. This, coupled with a poorly educated populace and a history of undemocratic governance since colonial times, has prevented the country from benefitting from the inclusive economic growth that comes with value addition, innovation and productivity. France as the former colonial power and significant investor in Guinea —alongside China, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom— must re-assess its economic objectives in the country to ensure that there is more investment in education and skills development, as opposed to the purely extractive and rent seeking activities that currently takes place. The deliberate policy of underdevelopment of the Guinean economy by France (through the “the Colonial pact”, a system of laws and regulations that European colonizing nations imposed on their former colonies) must also be reversed as it remains a significant contributing factor to the migrant problem that exists in the EU today.
Although Côte d’Ivoire (also a former French colony) has one of the largest economies in West Africa, the majority of its people derive absolutely no benefit from its economic success. A poverty rate of nearly 40% shares centre stage with its position as the largest cocoa producer globally, accounting for around 45% of the world’s cocoa supply. However, a huge gap in income exists between the bottom end of the value chain (i.e., cocoa farming) which Côte d’Ivoire dominates and the top end of the value chain, dominated by chocolate manufacturers in Germany, Belgium, Italy and Poland. Côte d’Ivoire’s earnings from cocoa production only amount to a paltry 4% of the global chocolate market, estimated at $113.16 billion in 2021. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), millions of cocoa farmers in the country survive on an average of just $0.78 a day. A better deal for Cocoa farmers must be negotiated and the country’s position as the world’s biggest producer of cocoa leveraged, to give the West African nation a bigger share of the cocoa value chain. Additionally, poverty reduction measures must be implemented across the country, especially in rural areas outside main cities like Abidjan, if illegal migrant numbers to the EU are to come down.
What is clear is that a sustainable reduction in migration to the EU can only be achieved if there is a corresponding impactful reduction in the disparity in the quality of life and opportunities that exists between the citizens of rich countries and those of poorer countries. The best way to achieve this is through the continued globalisation of economic policy by rich nations, rather than a retreat into nationalism and protectionist policies. Specific concerns of European citizens around immigration, such as the strain on social services and a loss of national identity, can only be addressed sustainably if the countries from which the migrants come from are supported socially and economically. What business would the people of Tunisia, Guinea or Côte d’Ivoire then have in coming to look for jobs in the EU if foreign direct investment in these countries resulted in their transformation into economic hotspots, focussed on inclusive economic growth that generates jobs, rather than capital repatriation by multinational companies? The EU is now confronted with the stark choice between signing more MOUs with African countries, similar to the one signed with Tunisia, or choosing not to do so. Fears that helping these countries economically could lead to further erosions in its share of global GDP (which fell from 27.6% to 14.5% between 1990 and 2023, largely as a result of increased globalisation) must be weighed up against the consequences of doing nothing, which would be the continued growth in influence of far-right parties across Europe.
